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Abstract—This paper presents ESCAPE, an informed moving
target defense mechanism for cloud containers. ESCAPE models
the interaction between attackers and their target containers as
a “predator searching for a prey” search game. Live migration
of Linux-containers (prey) is used to avoid attacks (predator)
and failures. The entire process is guided by a novel host-based
behavior-monitoring system that seamlessly monitors containers
for indications of intrusions and attacks. To evaluate ESCAPE
effectiveness, we simulated the attack avoidance process based
on a mathematical model mimicking the prey-vs-predator search
game. Simulation results show high container survival probabil-
ities with minimal added overhead.
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I. INTROUCTION
Linux containers running in a commercial cloud envi-
ronments share the same kernel with containers from other
customers, which increases the attack surface compared to the
case of VM-based virtualization. To protect Linux containers
in a shared environment, service providers are expected to
monitor the behavior of the containers running on their system
for suspicious activity. Upon detection of a possible threat,
the service provider should take an action to protect the guest
containers. While the most straightforward action is to kill the
misbehaving container and inform the owner of the detected
anomaly, such action may not be cost effective especially for
long running stateful applications.
A more cost-effective alternative [1] is to take a snapshot
of the running application while in safe state. Upon attack
detection, the system simply rolls back to the most recent
safe state saved. One drawback with this approach is when
the last saved safe state is a vulnerable state and/or the
attack is persistent, in which case the container will go into
a continuous loop of restores. To overcome such limitations,
we propose a nature inspired approach that aims at changing
the container execution environment in order to mislead a
persistent attack. The system aims to equip the attacker target
(prey) with the tools needed to ESCAPE from the attacker
(predator), e.g. by moving the container to a random remote
host.
In this paper, we use live migration of cloud containers as
a moving target defense (MTD) [2] mechanism against host-
based persistent attacks. The MTD mechanism is guided by
a host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) [3] [4] that
monitors operating containers to detect potential anomalies
or misbehaviors. The HIDS learns the behavior of all the
containers running on the host, and upon detection of a change
of behavior of one or more container, the HIDS signals the
MTD module of the system to ESCAPE the affected container.
We considered two types of applications, stateless and stateful
applications.
The system reacts gradually and according to the application
type. For stateful applications, the system is configured to start
by using the checkpoint/restore mechanism before switching
to the live-migration solution for a more persistent attack.
Delaying the use of live-migration until the attack is known to
be persistent (e.g. after N rollback attempts) saves the running
application the overhead associated with live migration as
compared to checkpoint/restore for non-persistent attacks. For
a stateless application, e.g. static web servers, upon attack
detection, the system simply restarts the server or migrates the
container to a new host while rerouting the associated network
connections.
The entire process is designed to mimic the famous “Prey-
vs-Predator” search game [5]. This game describes a scenario
were multiple predators are targeting specific prey moving in
a forest. We adopted this model into a guidance mechanism
to guide the prey in its mission to evade the predator. In our
scenario, the cloud is the forest. Each host in the cloud is a
potential escape location for the prey. The Prey is the attacker
(“predator”) targeted container-encapsulated application.
We built a simulation model to evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed approach in evading attacks. Additionally, we
conducted preliminary experiments on our local ACIS cloud to
evaluate the overhead of the live migration solution. Results
showed the effectiveness of our approach with a limited to
no overhead. ESCAPE was built to be as general as possible
with minimal application customization. The main advantage
of presenting generic defense tools is to give the user/system
administrator the chance to select the most appropriate tools
and applications that suits their needs with no constraints or
limitations. ESCAPE supports general purpose Linux contain-
ers as a lightweight operating system virtualization technology.
We are using Docker due to its popularity, small footprint, and
fast instantiation. However, the same concepts discussed here
can be applied to other Linux container systems, such as LXC
and OpenVZ.
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II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
ESCAPE mainly consists of three modules, namely the
behavior monitoring module, the checkpoint/restore module,
and the live migration module.
A. Behavior Monitoring
For monitoring purposes, we adopted the intrusion detection
system introduced in [4] to monitor the operating containers.
The system is specifically tailored for monitoring the behavior
of Linux containers, and depends on the fact that Linux
containers communicates with the host kernel and the outer
world by using system calls issued to the host kernel.
The monitoring system employs a background service run-
ning on the host kernel to monitor system calls between
any Docker containers and the host Kernel. Upon start of a
container, the service uses the open-source sysdig tool to
trace all system calls issued by the container to the host kernel.
The full trace is written to a log file that is processed in real
time and used to learn the container behavior.
The monitoring system uses a bag of system calls
(BoSC) [6] technique for learning the container behavior.
The system reads the behavior log file epoch by epoch. For
each epoch, a sliding window of size 10 is moved over
the system calls of the current epoch, counting the number
of occurrences of each distinct system call in the current
window, and producing a BoSC. When a new occurrence of
a system call is encountered, the corresponding index of the
BoSC is updated. If the current BoSC already exists in the
normal-behavior database, its frequency is incremented by 1.
Otherwise, the new BoSC is added to the database with initial
frequency of 1.
For detection mode, the system reads the behavior file epoch
by epoch. For each epoch, a sliding window is similarly
used to check if the current BoSC is present in the database
of normal behavior database. If a BoSC is not present in
the database, a mismatch is declared. The trace is declared
anomalous if the number of mismatches within one epoch ex-
ceeds a certain threshold. Upon attack detection, the resolution
mechanism is called and the migration process is triggered to
mimic the simulation scenario described in section III.
B. Checkpoint and Restore
The application running inside the container, whether state-
less or stateful, uses the host memory to host all runtime
related libraries, calculations, and other volatile contents. It
is too hard to recover these memory contents upon failure or
migration events. ESCAPE were built to serve both types of
applications with minor to no interference from the adminis-
trator or the programmer [7]. Our primary goal is to avoid
any container customization. We leveraged the encapsulated
state of the application and used CRIU to dump the container
memory into persistent set of files easy to share and recover.
CRIU is used only on state-full applications based containers,
we prefer not to use it on stateless type as the memory
content and the executed states are not important for container
restoration.
To enable checkpointing of running application, we are
using an experimental version of Docker that integrates a
checkpointing tool named CRIU to momentarily freeze the
running container and its enclosed applications taking a live
snapshot of the memory content and any used files. The
dumped images are stored into persistent storage.
CRIU is a tool to checkpoint/restore running tasks in user
space. CRIU momentarily freezes the running (container) runC
process and all its sub-processes (user apps) and checkpoint
it to a collection of image files that can be used to restore the
container to the exact state later. Between these dump events,
containers uses the host memory to operate to maximize the
application response rate.
For a failed container to be restored, the hosting server
must have access to the container image files, and the memory
dump files. The container image files is usually large in terms
of space. In our experiments, containers with full database
server can be as large as 500MB. However, the memory
dump is usually less than 10MB. The migration process for
stateless type is much easier, we replicate the container on
the destination server, then make a quick network switching
between the source and destination. The replication process
and container instantiation time is totally negligible as the
original container will still be running (assuming that we are
not recovering from failure), the migration process is entirely
logical as the network connections are the only this that is
going to ESCAPE . ESCAPE adjust the ARP table for the
NAT to point to the new server instead of the old one.
For faster instantiation, quick recovery, and easy container
migration, ESCAPE uses a remote shared storage as a con-
tainer repository to store runC containers. Running the con-
tainer from a remote storage gives instant access to multiple
remote servers to instantiate such containers. Using remote
repositories to host the base image of the container, massively
reduced the time needed to move all the files between hosts
in case of failure or live-migration. The only files that has to
be synchronized between the source and destination servers
are the memory dump which are so small and synchronize
momentarily.
C. Live Migration
For stateless applications, there is no need for checkpoint-
ing as the memory content is irrelevant for application re-
execution. The relaxation of that constraint made it much
easier for ESCAPE to recover such container in case of
failure/attack.
Prior to starting the migration process, ESCAPE instanti-
ates/selects a suitable destination. The current implementation
follows the prey-vs predator model described in section III
to select the next destination for the migrating container.
ESCAPE can also select a destination with far logical distance
from the source to evade attackers. The logical distance is
defined based on a heterogeneity scale. The more different the
destination is in terms of configuration, network, and datacen-
ter association the more likely for ESCAPE to select. ESCAPE
aims to select such host to complicate the reapplication of
the same cause of failure. However, considering that level of
heterogeneity might induce resurrection conflicts.
Upon selecting an appropriate destination, ESCAPE mounts
the shared storage drive that holds the running container, and
adjust the network settings to facilitate network relocation. The
migration process then starts by checkpointing the container,
killing the process on the original host, make an ARP update
to change the MAC/IP assignment of the old server network
interface to match the new one while mainlining the IP value,
and restore the container and all enclosed applications on
the destination server. The entire process occurs in matter of
milliseconds. Following the aforementioned process guarantee
almost zero downtime unless the source host fails completely
during the process.
III. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
A. Model Design
We have generated a mathematical model for evaluating
the efficiency of the live migration mechanism of application
containers adopted by ESCAPE to evading host-based cyber
attacks. The developed model depends on theories and models
of evolutionary search games [8]. We adopted the predator-
prey model as a reference model to develop our mathematical
model assuming an evasive prey [9]. Our model simulates and
evaluates ESCAPE in mobilizing targeted containers across a
set of attack-prone hosts within a virtual network considering
some of containers running on those hosts are under attack.
We target in our ESCAPE performance evaluation study
the survival probability of a targeted application container
implemented on a host when operating over a cloud of
networking hosts. The survival probability Pstatic(t) of a static
application container in a host is given by:
Pstatic(t) = e
−ρS(t) = e−
N
V S(t)
Where ρ = N/V is the hacked host density, N is the
number of hacked hosts, V is the number of all hosts in the
studied network, and S(t) is the mean number of distinct hosts
visited by mobile attackers up to time t and hosts’ application
containers malfunction. As t increases, number of visited
hosts increases (referring to the mobility of attacks and the
possibility of having attacks widely spreading at many hosts).
S(t) ≈ pit/(ln(t)) for a two-dimensional square area [9].
The survival probability Pmobile(t) of a mobile application
container is given by:
ln
(
Pmobile(t)
)
≈
(N
V
)2
ln
(
Pstatic(T )
)
We assume that not all visited hosts by attackers will
misbehave and only some related application containers will
breakdown. In other words, we propose that a fraction of S(t)
will exist with exponential probability 1 − e−td where td is
the required time of detecting attacker’s visits to a host. The
mean number of hosts visited by mobile attackers that were
successfully able to cause targeted containers to malfunction
without detection, S(t)success, is given by.
S(t)success = (1− e−td)S(t)
We consider two different growth models of attacks which
are exponential and logistic growth as discussed in [5]. Those
models discuss different rates of growth which refer to the
spreading rate of attack in a networking context and how
ESCAPE can succeed in mitigating such growth.
• Rapid increase of hacked hosts
N(t) = N(0)ekt
where N(0) is the initial number of hacked hosts at time
0, and k is a constant related to the increasing rate at any
time t,
• Slow increase of hacked hosts
N(t) =
µN(0)ekt
N(0)ekt+ µ−N(0)
where µ is the carrying capacity which controls the
increasing rate of N that when N approaches µ, the
increasing rate approaches zero. Also, N(t) approaches
N(0) when t→ 0, and approaches µ when t→∞.
B. Evaluation Study
We conducted a simple simulation scenario of container-
based cloud established by a set of connected hosts under the
following two assumptions: 1) We have one prey, N hacked
hosts, and V total hosts (where N ≤ V ), and 2) Neighboring
hosts to a hacked host are susceptible to the same attack.
The N attackers are targeting the host of the valuable
application container. When the attacker reaches a certain host,
it spends some time on it after which all application containers
working on that host fail. We considered both static and mobile
container scenarios. Static containers are settled in one host,
while mobile containers can migrate from a host to another
one. We study the effect of having small and large number
of hacked hosts (N ) on the survival probabilities considering
two cases:
1) Static N : N is fixed (dN(t)/dt = 0) during the
simulation, i.e. the attackers move from one host to
another preserving the total number of hacked hosts (N ).
2) Dynamic N : N varies with the simulation time
(dN(t)/dt 6= 0), i.e., attackers migrate to other hosts
and attack new hosts (number of hacked hosts increases
with the simulation time). We repeat the scenarios when
N has rapid and slow increasing rates and how N affects
the survival probabilities of targeted containers
We then repeat the previous scenarios when applying the
concept of attacker success on survival probabilities of targeted
application containers.
Figure 1 shows the impact of changing the number of
hacked hosts (N ) on a network of 20 hosts where the targeted
contained located in one host. The figure shows that we can
have higher survival probabilities in case of having mobile
targeted application container capability. Figure 2 shows that
at various detection times and 7 hacked hosts, we can get
better survival probabilities at smaller detection times. If we
compared the obtained results in figure 2 with the simulated
survival probability value at case N = 7 at figure 1, we
Fig. 1: Survival probability of a static/mobile container at different number
of hacked hosts (N )
can notice the improvement in the results at small detection
times. Figures 3 and 4 show the impact of having logistic
Fig. 2: Survival probability of a targeted mobile container at 7 hacked hosts
and various attack detection times
growth of attacks on the survival probability of a static/mobile
application containers in case of having various increasing
rates and attack detection times, respectively. As we have small
attack detection times, we can mitigate the high growth rate
of attacks and their spread in many hosts.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced ESCAPE, a novel nature-
inspired mechanism for attack detection and avoidance. ES-
CAPE deploys a novel interrelated real-time monitoring and
live migration of cloud containers. We proposed a mathe-
matical model based on evolutionary search games to guide
ESCAPE. The same model is used to simulate ESCAPE
operation and to evaluate its performance. ESCAPE was able
to effectively and efficiently detect and avoid persistent attacks
achieving high survival probabilities of legitimate application
containers.
Fig. 3: Survival probability of a static/mobile targeted container at various
increasing rates of logistic attack growth
Fig. 4: Survival probability of a mobile targeted container at logistic attack
growth with various attack detection time
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